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Resolving Sovereign Debt Crises 
with Collective Action Clauses 
Ever since Mexico’s “Tequila crisis”in 1994–1995,
policymakers have debated how best to reduce the
cost of protracted sovereign debt restructuring
when emerging markets are in financial crisis.Two
dominant approaches have emerged.One promotes
changes in the bond contracts international lenders
offer;in particular,it encourages the use of collec-
tive action clauses (CACs) rather than unanimous
action clauses (UACs).The other approach proposes
creating statutory procedures for restructuring
unsustainable debt.
At their spring 2003 meetings, the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank decided to
move forward with the contractual approach while
continuing to study the IMF’s proposed Sovereign
Debt Restructuring Mechanism.This decision
was shaped by Mexico’s successful launch in March
2003 of a $1 billion global bond in New York
that included CACs; subsequently, Mexico, Korea,
South Africa, and Brazil issued bonds with sim-
ilar provisions.
CACs allow a qualified majority of the holders of
a bond issue (typically representing 75% of the debt
for sovereign debt) to vote to bind all bondholders
to a change in the terms of the bond contract;
UACs, in contrast, require that all holders vote on
a change in the terms of the contract.With UACs,
individual bondholders can take advantage of the
situation and veto restructurings while they hold
out for preferential treatment; CACs effectively
thwart this behavior.
CACs are routinely included in bonds issued in
the United Kingdom and Luxembourg. For sov-
ereign bonds issued in the United States (typically,
under New York law), majority action clauses are
rarely applied to the terms of repayment, either
the amounts or timing of repayments. Under the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, publicly issued cor-
porate bonds must require the consent of all bond-
holders to revise the terms of repayment.This act
does not apply to sovereign debt issued in the
United States, but bonds issued in New York
overwhelmingly follow this convention.The same
applies to sovereign bonds issued in Germany,
while Japanese law appears to require the appli-
cation of unanimous consent to international
bond issues.
The promotion of CACs raises at least three con-
cerns. One is whether the clauses actually do reduce
the cost of protracted debt restructurings; further-
more, if they do, then a negative consequence is
that they can induce “moral hazard”—that is, if
the governments of emerging market economies
find it easier to handle debt crises, they may not
work so hard to avoid them, so debt crises might
happen more readily.Another concern is whether
it will be very difficult for countries whose existing
bond issues feature UACs to make the transition
to CACs.A third concern is that CACs apply to
individual bond issues separately, so that CACs
may not help when many bond issues need to be
restructured simultaneously in a coordinated way.
In this Economic Letter,I  summarize the empirical
evidence on how interest rate premiums—that is,
the spread between a measure of the interest rate
on a relatively risk-free blond and the interest rate
on sovereign bonds—vary with the inclusion of
CACs; I also discuss how the differences in these
premiums shed light shed on the debate over the
potential benefits of CACs for investment-grade
and speculative-grade countries.
Measuring the effects of CACs
Quantitative studies of the effects of CACs generally
compare the interest rate premiums between bonds
issued with and without CACs,focusing on bonds
issued in the UK with those issued in the US.A
higher premium suggests higher risk,which implies
that creditors expect the moral hazard problem
to dominate the benefits of easing restructuring
under stress.A higher premium also should be
associated with lower capital inflows to borrowers
and, perhaps, to resistance to the wider adoption
of CACs.A lower premium suggests that the
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encouragement of collective action provisions is
beneficial. Studies by Eichengreen and Mody
(2000a,b) and by Becker,Richards,and Thaicharoen
(2000) concentrate on premiums for the launches
of primary issues, while Richards and Gugiatti
(2003) and Eichengreen,Kletzer,and Mody (2003)
expand the data to consider both primary and
secondary market premiums for a very inclusive
set of bond issues.The datasets and methods of
analysis vary,but the last,and latest,of these papers
analyzes data that includes the universe of bond
issues studied by the others.
A major finding of Eichengreen and Mody (2000a,b)
and of Eichengreen, Kletzer and Mody (2003) is
that the credit rating of the issuer matters.The
inclusion of CACs lowers interest rate premiums
on bonds issued by countries with investment-grade
ratings and raises them for bonds issued by debtors
with sub-investment-grade ratings. General senti-
ment in the market for emerging market bonds
also matters.Interest rate premiums on bonds issued
with CACs rise relative to premiums for bonds
issued with UACs when the premium for the
Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) higher,
that is,when bonds issued from emerging markets
generally are viewed as riskier. CACs lower bor-
rowing costs, as evidenced by both launch and
secondary market interest rate premiums,for more
countries and by larger amounts for investment-
grade countries when the EMBI is lower, that is,
when the emerging bond market is strong.An
interpretation of this result is that investors fear
that when the EMBI is higher, individual debtor
countries may use the general uncertainty as cover
for taking greater risks which may lead to default.
Overall, the empirical evidence to date supports
the conclusion that the use of CACs will mod-
estly reduce funding costs for investment-grade
emerging market borrowers and raise them for
lower-rated countries.
The issues by Mexico and Brazil in late spring of
this year, issued under New York law with CACs,
reflect the results of these estimations. Mexico’s
first issue featuring CACs, with a maturation date
in 2015, was priced to yield a spread of 313 basis
points over 10-year U.S. treasuries at the time of
issue. Exact comparison bonds do not exist, but
market analysis suggests that this bond was priced
at a premium of about 8 to 10 basis points over
otherwise comparable bonds issued by Mexico
with UACs.A similar bond issued in April 2003,
was thought to be issued at a small discount.The
empirical analysis implies that a country that has
just reached investment-grade status (Mexico had
bond ratings of BBB–/Baa2 from Standard and
Poor’s and from Moody’s, respectively) should
realize a discount of about 25 basis points for
such bonds relative to the yield curve.
Brazil’s $1 billion issue in late April was the first
speculative-grade bond issued under the initiative
(Brazil’s ratings were B2 and B+, respectively).
This bond was not comparable in that it requires
approval of 85% of bondholders for repayment
restructuring while the other bonds issued require
75% majorities. Some market observers judged
Brazil to be paying a penalty of 10 to 15 basis
points for the CACs, consistent the empirical
results of Eichengreen,et al.,while others detected
no premium or discount, consistent with the
notion that the penalty should fall as the qualified
majority requirement tightens.
The transition problem
More than two-thirds of current outstanding emerg-
ing market debt carries UACs, and many of these
bonds will not mature for several years.Therefore,
the transition to widespread use of CACs might take
some time.One question,addressed by Eichengreen,
et al., is whether countries with predominantly
UAC debt will want to issue new bonds with
CACs.Another is whether markets eventually will
revert to bonds issued with UACs.To investigate
these transition issues,they estimate how the share
of outstanding debt issued in bonds with CACs
affects the interest costs for the borrower.Consistent
with the view that restructurings are more likely
for low-rated debtors, they find that the interest
rate premium is higher for bonds issued with CACs
when the overwhelming majority of outstanding
debt carries UACs for low-rated countries,but not
for higher-rated speculative-grade and invest-
ment-grade borrowers.They also find that when
the majority of existing debt is issued with CACs,
a new issue with UACs pays a premium for low-
rated issuers. It may be that the holders of bonds
with UACs fear that can be left hanging when
the government restructures the majority of its
debt using CACs.
The coordination problem with multiple bond issues
CACs are structured to help coordinate the actions
of holders of a specific bond issue. But countries
may have multiple bond issues—for example,
Argentina currently has 80 outstanding bond
issues—and that can raise another coordinationproblem. In particular, the qualified majority of a
single bond issue can act as holdouts in the rene-
gotiation of a country’s debt.Bankruptcy proceed-
ings address this problem for corporations or
individuals, and it is an important motivation for
the IMF’s proposals to establish international debt
restructuring procedures.Empirically,its importance
can be considered by estimating the effect of the
number of bond issues outstanding on the interest
premium demanded by investors for bonds issued
with CACs. Eichengreen, et al. (2003) do find a
small multiplicity premium for all issues, but it is
not affected by whether the outstanding bonds are
issued with CACs.
Although CACs do not exacerbate the coordination
problem with multiple bond issues, they might be
used to reduce it for countries that are more likely
to restructure through the adoption of super-CACs
during times of distress. For example, Uruguay
undertook an innovative bond exchange in April
and May of 2003.The new bonds include super-
CACs that allow revisions of financial terms if 75%
of the holders of an issue agree or if 85% of the
holders all of bond issues and 66.66% of the hold-
ers of each affected issue agree.The exchange was
successful,but the terms encouraged exit consents,
which deface old bonds, and the government
warned that default might be the only alternative.
Are CACs a small step in the right direction?
By pricing moral hazard in sovereign debt markets,
CACs could encourage market discipline.By facil-
itating creditor coordination, CACs also should
reduce the costs in terms of a nation’s output that
are due to protracted debt restructurings.Any sub-
stantial benefits of promoting CACs in sovereign
bonds might require further innovations to the
international financial architecture. For example,
by reducing the costs of debt restructuring, CACs
might relax the pressure on the IMF to extend
financial assistance to countries whose debts may
not be sustainable. If both creditors and debtors
perceive a lower probability of IMF intervention,
then greater market discipline might follow.
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